Friday, October 16, 2009
Evidence vs Theory
The posts on systems got me thinking: evidence or logic, which should we trust more? Part of the project I'm involved in looks at how lignin degrades compared to cellulose. Lignin is a carbon molecule with many different bonds making it very hard to degrade. It requires many different kinds of enzymes working in concert. Because of this, only a hand full of microorganisms can degrade it. Cellulose on the other hand is a carbon molecule with simple linkages that takes just a few enzymes to degrade. Many microorganisms can degrade cellulose because of this. So by logic, cellulose should degrade faster than lignin. But when we put them out in the forest soil, lignin degraded faster than cellulose! We've looked everywhere for a reason, but found none. The logic behind degradation is solid. There were no experimental mistakes we can think of. And lignin and cellulose were pure. So, should we trust the logic and ignore the evidence, or should we trust at the evidence and try and find different logic behind it?
Systems: science vs philosophy #2
Here's what New Morning had to say;
Philosophers understand systems in ways similar to scientists. However, whereas scientists tend to use systemic analyses, philosophers question the significance of such analyses. As well, philosophers inquire into the *concept* of systems. That is, philosophers tend to care less about this or that system and more about the generic being of a system. What are systems, uberhaupt?-- This is a philosopher's question. In the above description of systems from Jackson's post there is an implicit understanding of the nature and function of systems. A philosopher would concern himself with what is left implicit in Jackson's understanding of system and ask if there were any *presuppositions* about the nature and function of systems. These presuppositions might obscure a larger understanding of systems. A philosopher might wonder if *all* systems operate in relation to external boundaries, or if only a certain species of systems do, such as autopoietic systems, or dynamical systems which constantly receive inputs of energy or matter in order to maintain themselves. Might then the scientists too specific understanding of systems obscure his research of systems that do not function by drawing a boundary from an environment, such as self-referential systems or the system of all systems?
But it is indeed the case that the dominant, and also current, scientific understanding of systems is one where systems are defined against external boundaries. Apart from grand theories of the universe that define the whole of the world systemically, or the curious and quirky Gaia hypothesis, it seems the case that we live in a world defined by systems that operate due to their capacity to distinguish themselves from their environments through the use of boundaries, such as plant and animal cells, brains, languages, the economy, etc.
I think ecosystem science is moving toward the direction of examining implicit assumptions of systems study. But we haven't found it not too necessary because evidence can convince a lot of people in science. I think ecosystem scientists feel less of a need to examine them because we can test the functions of a system without knowing what are all the implicit assumptions or the general principles governing all other systems. And, unlike philosophers, scientists are interested in the contents of a system than the system itself.
Philosophers understand systems in ways similar to scientists. However, whereas scientists tend to use systemic analyses, philosophers question the significance of such analyses. As well, philosophers inquire into the *concept* of systems. That is, philosophers tend to care less about this or that system and more about the generic being of a system. What are systems, uberhaupt?-- This is a philosopher's question. In the above description of systems from Jackson's post there is an implicit understanding of the nature and function of systems. A philosopher would concern himself with what is left implicit in Jackson's understanding of system and ask if there were any *presuppositions* about the nature and function of systems. These presuppositions might obscure a larger understanding of systems. A philosopher might wonder if *all* systems operate in relation to external boundaries, or if only a certain species of systems do, such as autopoietic systems, or dynamical systems which constantly receive inputs of energy or matter in order to maintain themselves. Might then the scientists too specific understanding of systems obscure his research of systems that do not function by drawing a boundary from an environment, such as self-referential systems or the system of all systems?
But it is indeed the case that the dominant, and also current, scientific understanding of systems is one where systems are defined against external boundaries. Apart from grand theories of the universe that define the whole of the world systemically, or the curious and quirky Gaia hypothesis, it seems the case that we live in a world defined by systems that operate due to their capacity to distinguish themselves from their environments through the use of boundaries, such as plant and animal cells, brains, languages, the economy, etc.
I think ecosystem science is moving toward the direction of examining implicit assumptions of systems study. But we haven't found it not too necessary because evidence can convince a lot of people in science. I think ecosystem scientists feel less of a need to examine them because we can test the functions of a system without knowing what are all the implicit assumptions or the general principles governing all other systems. And, unlike philosophers, scientists are interested in the contents of a system than the system itself.
Systems philosophy, which I distinguish from the sociological "systems theory," is very much a field not of armchair speculation, but of empirical research, and modern political-economy. The very notion of system is today inseparable from modern society's attempt to manage and monitor itself. Michel Foucault, French philosopher and intellectual historian of the 1960s through 80s, characterized society through the ways in which it observed itself, controlled itself, and defined itself. The core concepts that define and articulate systems are precisely ones of control and observation. However, just what systems philosophy means by these terms is less clear than that doxa which tends to define our most common understanding of systems. We tend to think of systems as imparting an organization to their elements that are at least minimally alien to these elements. Systems, in everyday parlance, have thus been commonly treated as alien to our freedoms (as bureaucracies), our desires, and we commonly hear it said that systems should be resisted, or overturned. But what ideas of control and observation does systems philosophy entertain?
Control: In systems philosophy control is a way of designating the way in which systems *communicate* or maintain themselves. System maintenance is indeed a question of the manner in which a system communicates. This discourse of "communication" owes in largest part to the cyberneticians of the 20th century, such as Norbert Weiner, etc. Control, for Weiner, was only an act of communication while control only occurs for systems if communication also happens. We are far less weary of the idea of communication than we are of control, but the reasons for this are generally ideological.
The cybernetic development of the concept of control was meant to challenge older philosophical ideas of causation. Classical laws of cause and effect were based on the idea that there was more being or perfection in the cause than in the effect (such as God in comparison with his creatures). As philosophers took the idea that God, or basic substances, could possibly possess less being, or less force and efficacy than the things they caused to be unsound reasoning, so a tradition of thought had it that cause preceded effect and that cause explained effect. We still tend to think this way today. Yet in social communication, for instance, it is easy to see that we have to wait for causes to cause their effects and that causes can cause many, sometimes surprising, effects. Time and uncertaintly have been imported into our active understanding of social communication. The cyberneticians realized that causes *select* their effects and that effects have to select their causes.
More to come...
Control: In systems philosophy control is a way of designating the way in which systems *communicate* or maintain themselves. System maintenance is indeed a question of the manner in which a system communicates. This discourse of "communication" owes in largest part to the cyberneticians of the 20th century, such as Norbert Weiner, etc. Control, for Weiner, was only an act of communication while control only occurs for systems if communication also happens. We are far less weary of the idea of communication than we are of control, but the reasons for this are generally ideological.
The cybernetic development of the concept of control was meant to challenge older philosophical ideas of causation. Classical laws of cause and effect were based on the idea that there was more being or perfection in the cause than in the effect (such as God in comparison with his creatures). As philosophers took the idea that God, or basic substances, could possibly possess less being, or less force and efficacy than the things they caused to be unsound reasoning, so a tradition of thought had it that cause preceded effect and that cause explained effect. We still tend to think this way today. Yet in social communication, for instance, it is easy to see that we have to wait for causes to cause their effects and that causes can cause many, sometimes surprising, effects. Time and uncertaintly have been imported into our active understanding of social communication. The cyberneticians realized that causes *select* their effects and that effects have to select their causes.
More to come...
Thursday, October 15, 2009
Soar Falcon!
The humble little town of Fort Collins, CO became famous today the American way. A family described as alien experts obsessed with science thought their boy floated away in an UFO look alike weather balloon. The boy's name was Falcon. His family had their 15 min in a TV show "Wife Swap". His dad started an amateur science group called The Psyience Detectives. So the police gave chase, only to find no one inside the balloon after it landed softly in a dirt field. Falcon was actually hiding in the attic at the family house. This is Fort Collins, Colorado, USA in a nutshell, really.
Systems: science vs philosophy
I think the word "system" means differently to scientists and philosophers, but I fear scientists are missing out on some good stuff without understanding the difference. So here, I describe the scientist's use of the word "system". How is it different?
Scientists use the word to put a boundary on nature. Forest system or catchment system (in ecosystem science) elects a boarder to segregate what's inside of it for easier understanding. Forests from grasslands for example. Or one catchment from another in different parts of a continent. It reduces the variables involved and makes it easier to conceptualize and experiment. Inter system comparisons can help too. It highlights common processes that might explain bigger system like the terrestrial system. It can also explain why the systems differ. But the underlying aim of the systems science is to reveal main influences to an outcome. Why does the tropics have more trees than the deserts? Mainly because of more water favors a type of photosynthesis that waste water but makes more carbon molecules.
There certainly limits to this way of thinking. Just because an area has more water doesn't always mean it will have trees. Traditional (eco)system science describes steady or equilibrium states well but not dynamic and uncertain conditions. So the ecosystem scientists are starting to use probabilities (Bayesian statistics) to describe systems and more so to predict it's behavior. In a way, this tries to simulate the complexities of a system rather than simplify it. The question "what would happen to plants in an area if CO2 increased?" can be better understood using Bayesian method. But I'm not quite sure if this is truly "understanding".
Now, how is this different from philosopher's understanding of a system?
Scientists use the word to put a boundary on nature. Forest system or catchment system (in ecosystem science) elects a boarder to segregate what's inside of it for easier understanding. Forests from grasslands for example. Or one catchment from another in different parts of a continent. It reduces the variables involved and makes it easier to conceptualize and experiment. Inter system comparisons can help too. It highlights common processes that might explain bigger system like the terrestrial system. It can also explain why the systems differ. But the underlying aim of the systems science is to reveal main influences to an outcome. Why does the tropics have more trees than the deserts? Mainly because of more water favors a type of photosynthesis that waste water but makes more carbon molecules.
There certainly limits to this way of thinking. Just because an area has more water doesn't always mean it will have trees. Traditional (eco)system science describes steady or equilibrium states well but not dynamic and uncertain conditions. So the ecosystem scientists are starting to use probabilities (Bayesian statistics) to describe systems and more so to predict it's behavior. In a way, this tries to simulate the complexities of a system rather than simplify it. The question "what would happen to plants in an area if CO2 increased?" can be better understood using Bayesian method. But I'm not quite sure if this is truly "understanding".
Now, how is this different from philosopher's understanding of a system?
We still have quite a bit to learn from the German Idealists about systems, and system-building, about the nature and limits of systemic thought. Perhaps the greatest lesson of the German Idealists is that 'system philosophy,' also commonly referred to as 'systems thinking,' systemics, or 'systems theory' (to be distinguished from the sociological systems theory of thinkers such as Niklas Luhmann), etc., encourages both good scepticism toward already-received knowledge, challenging thought's tendency to get locked up in intractable aporias or the doxa of everyday opinion and offers the type of synthesis of the special disciplines that unites our knowledge so that it might be coordinated and applied for a diversity of practical purposes. System philosophy ought to be distinguished from the system sciences, however, because system philosophy maintains a critical stance toward the results of scientific research. Where system sciences collect knowledge, system philosophy asks about the _significance_ of this knowledge.
Systems philosophy in the 20th and 21st centuries has been partially obscured by the dominance of systems sciences and their 'theoretical' practices. Klir (1965):
The concept of system is one of the most widely used concepts in science, particularly in recent times. It is encountered in nearly all the fundamental fields of science, e.g., in physics, chemistry, mathematics, logic, cybernetics, economy, linguistics, biology, psychology and also in the majority of engineering branches. We are concerned with a very general concept.
System sciences grew out of a larger ‘unity of science movement of 1920s-40s.’ Systems philosophy in the 20th century was able to benefit from this movement, rejuvenating itself by consulting the theoretical efforts of the so-called ‘General Systems Theory' (Bertalanffy, Laszlo), and the researches of the cybernetics and information theory movements. General Systems Theory (GTS) called traditional scientific concepts of linear causality, determinism, and reductionism into question and replaced or supplemented them with notions of circular causality, self-organization, indeterminacy, and the unpredictable emergence of order from disorder. GST worked toward developing a unified theory and methodological approach to investigate not just the classical simplicities of the mechanistically structured material world, but also the complexities of biological, cognitive, and even social systems. Systems philosophy at the current juncture is informed both by the past (the insights of German Idealists, etc.) as well as by continued research in the sciences (and of course the 'system sciences' whose research is specifically guided by the concept of system).
Systems philosophy in the 20th and 21st centuries has been partially obscured by the dominance of systems sciences and their 'theoretical' practices. Klir (1965):
The concept of system is one of the most widely used concepts in science, particularly in recent times. It is encountered in nearly all the fundamental fields of science, e.g., in physics, chemistry, mathematics, logic, cybernetics, economy, linguistics, biology, psychology and also in the majority of engineering branches. We are concerned with a very general concept.
System sciences grew out of a larger ‘unity of science movement of 1920s-40s.’ Systems philosophy in the 20th century was able to benefit from this movement, rejuvenating itself by consulting the theoretical efforts of the so-called ‘General Systems Theory' (Bertalanffy, Laszlo), and the researches of the cybernetics and information theory movements. General Systems Theory (GTS) called traditional scientific concepts of linear causality, determinism, and reductionism into question and replaced or supplemented them with notions of circular causality, self-organization, indeterminacy, and the unpredictable emergence of order from disorder. GST worked toward developing a unified theory and methodological approach to investigate not just the classical simplicities of the mechanistically structured material world, but also the complexities of biological, cognitive, and even social systems. Systems philosophy at the current juncture is informed both by the past (the insights of German Idealists, etc.) as well as by continued research in the sciences (and of course the 'system sciences' whose research is specifically guided by the concept of system).
What is a system? Little attention has been paid to the historical development of the concept of system in order to understand what is meant by the term. Yet work outside of philosophy-- work in experimental embryology, evolutionary developmental biology, developmental psychology, sociological theory, the physical and chemical sciences, etc.-- has converged on a conception of system which first found decisive focus in the German Idealist philosophical tradition. To be sure, the widespread, even casual, use of the term in the 20th and 21st centuries owes a conceptual debt to the German Idealists. Systems were an obsession of the German Idealists (Kant, Fichte, Reinhold, Bardili, Schelling, Hegel). The notion of a fully-formed, perfected system established the epistemological, and even ontological, ideal for philosophical speculation and scientific knowledge ('Wissenschaft') in the latter part of the 18th century and continuing on well into the latter part of the
19the century. For the German Idealists, systems were a question of a particular brand of philosophical inquiry known as speculation. Speculation involved the rigorous tracing back of any philosophical or scientific explanation of phenomena to an absolute foundation (of certainty and coherence) such that the phenomena could be fully justified as irrefutable knowledge. Not high-flown discourses on the nature and proofs of God's existence, but mathematical theorems, stoichiometrical relationships, accounts of the evolutionary genesis of animal forms, all of these species of knowledge stood or fell within a form of speculative, systemic justification. It was the pursuit of the systematic philosophers of the German Idealist tradition to gather a diversity of empirical knowledge and to synthesize it in one master-system, under one philosophical principle holding for all knowledge, in logic, nature, and the human sciences (the sciences of the human 'spirit'). This type of philosophy, system philosophy, reached a peak, but also a strange dead end, in Hegel’s great “scientific” elaboration of system in his magisterial _Science of Logic_ (with editions pubslihed between the years of 1812 and 1832).
19the century. For the German Idealists, systems were a question of a particular brand of philosophical inquiry known as speculation. Speculation involved the rigorous tracing back of any philosophical or scientific explanation of phenomena to an absolute foundation (of certainty and coherence) such that the phenomena could be fully justified as irrefutable knowledge. Not high-flown discourses on the nature and proofs of God's existence, but mathematical theorems, stoichiometrical relationships, accounts of the evolutionary genesis of animal forms, all of these species of knowledge stood or fell within a form of speculative, systemic justification. It was the pursuit of the systematic philosophers of the German Idealist tradition to gather a diversity of empirical knowledge and to synthesize it in one master-system, under one philosophical principle holding for all knowledge, in logic, nature, and the human sciences (the sciences of the human 'spirit'). This type of philosophy, system philosophy, reached a peak, but also a strange dead end, in Hegel’s great “scientific” elaboration of system in his magisterial _Science of Logic_ (with editions pubslihed between the years of 1812 and 1832).
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