I think the word "system" means differently to scientists and philosophers, but I fear scientists are missing out on some good stuff without understanding the difference. So here, I describe the scientist's use of the word "system". How is it different?
Scientists use the word to put a boundary on nature. Forest system or catchment system (in ecosystem science) elects a boarder to segregate what's inside of it for easier understanding. Forests from grasslands for example. Or one catchment from another in different parts of a continent. It reduces the variables involved and makes it easier to conceptualize and experiment. Inter system comparisons can help too. It highlights common processes that might explain bigger system like the terrestrial system. It can also explain why the systems differ. But the underlying aim of the systems science is to reveal main influences to an outcome. Why does the tropics have more trees than the deserts? Mainly because of more water favors a type of photosynthesis that waste water but makes more carbon molecules.
There certainly limits to this way of thinking. Just because an area has more water doesn't always mean it will have trees. Traditional (eco)system science describes steady or equilibrium states well but not dynamic and uncertain conditions. So the ecosystem scientists are starting to use probabilities (Bayesian statistics) to describe systems and more so to predict it's behavior. In a way, this tries to simulate the complexities of a system rather than simplify it. The question "what would happen to plants in an area if CO2 increased?" can be better understood using Bayesian method. But I'm not quite sure if this is truly "understanding".
Now, how is this different from philosopher's understanding of a system?
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Philosophers understand systems in ways similar to scientists. However, whereas scientists tend to use systemic analyses, philosophers question the significance of such analyses. As well, philosophers inquire into the *concept* of systems. That is, philosophers tend to care less about this or that system and more about the generic being of a system. What are systems, uberhaupt?-- This is a philosopher's question. In the above description of systems from Jackson's post there is an implicit understanding of the nature and function of systems. A philosopher would concern himself with what is left implicit in Jackson's understanding of system and ask if there were any *presuppositions* about the nature and function of systems. These presuppositions might obscure a larger understanding of systems. A philosopher might wonder if *all* systems operate in relation to external boundaries, or if only a certain species of systems do, such as autopoietic systems, or dynamical systems which constantly receive inputs of energy or matter in order to maintain themselves. Might then the scientists too specific understanding of systems obscure his research of systems that do not function by drawing a boundary from an environment, such as self-referential systems or the system of all systems?
ReplyDeleteBut it is indeed the case that the dominant, and also current, scientific understanding of systems is one where systems are defined against external boundaries. Apart from grand theories of the universe that define the whole of the world systemically, or the curious and quirky Gaia hypothesis, it seems the case that we live in a world defined by systems that operate due to their capacity to distinguish themselves from their environments through the use of boundaries, such as plant and animal cells, brains, languages, the economy, etc.